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mAbstract
Purpose: Commercial aviation is feasible thanks to the complex socio-technical air
transportation system, which involves interactions between human operators,
technical systems, and procedures. In view of the expected growth in commercial
aviation, significant changes in this socio-technical system are in development both
in the USA and Europe. Such a complex socio-technical system may generate various
types of emergent behavior, which may range from simple emergence, through
weak emergence, up to strong emergence. The purpose of this paper is to
demonstrate that agent-based modeling and simulation allows identifying changed
and novel rare emergent behavior in this complex socio-technical system.
Methods: An agent based model of a specific operation at an airport has been
developed. The specific operation considered is the controlled crossing by a taxiing
aircraft of a runway that is in use for controlled departures. The agent-based model
includes all relevant human and technical agents, such as the aircraft, the pilots, the
controllers and the decision support systems involved. This agent-based model is
used to conduct rare event Monte Carlo (MC) simulations.
Results: The MC simulation results obtained confirm that agent based modeling and
simulation of a socio-technical air transportation system allows to identify rare
emergent behavior that was not identified through earlier, non-agent-based
simulations, including human-in-the-loop simulations of the same operation. A
typical example of such emergent behavior is the finding that alerting systems do
not really reduce the safety risk.
Conclusions: Agent based MC simulations of commercial aviation operations has
been demonstrated as a viable way to be evaluated regarding rare emergent
behaviour. This rare emergent behaviour could not have been found through the
more traditional simulation approaches.
Keywords: Agent-based modeling and simulation; Complex socio-technical systems;
Air transportation; Airport operations; Safety risk analysisBackground
The Air Traffic Management (ATM) community is continuously seeking to improve
ATM system performance and identify best practices (PRC & ATOS PBU 2009). Within
the Single European Sky ATM Research program (SESAR), a performance framework for
the future European ATM system has been proposed (SESAR Consortium 2006). This
framework aims at improving ATM system performance, in particular with regard to the
Key Performance Areas (KPAs) safety, capacity, cost efficiency, and environment. These2013 Bouarfa et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
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concerns (Bouarfa et al. 2012; Fron 2001). As part of this framework, airport performance
is considered to have an impact on the entire ATM system performance, as airports make
up the fixed nodes on which the ATM system is built (Ball et al. 2007; PRC 2009).
Civil air transportation is an example of a complex socio-technical system. Each air-
port comprises of interactions between a variety of facilities, users, technical systems,
human resources, rules, and procedures, and is embedded in a large network of other
airports, multiple airlines, and ATM centers. This type of complex socio-technical sys-
tems is characterized by a large number of interconnected parts, the difficulty to pre-
dict the behavior, and the existence of many different stakeholders (Forrester 1971;
Sussman 2007a-b). Moreover, in civil air transportation, different parties are involved in
the operation of an airport with varying boundaries of responsibility per region or
country. At Amsterdam Airport Schiphol for instance, the parties involved in air trans-
port related operations include the airport operator, the airport authority, the ministry
of infrastructure and environment, the slot coordinators, the air navigation service pro-
vider, the airlines, as well as the general public (Deregee 2006). All these stakeholders
have a certain viewpoint on performance which adds to the airport complexity (Bouarfa
et al. 2012). In addition, each airport is characterized by a number of runways, taxiways,
navigational aids, stop-bars, markings, and so on. Technology plays a central role in the
airport system as does the social context within which the system is operating. This
makes major airports by their very own nature complex socio-technical systems.
Past experience has shown that improving airport and ATM performance is very dif-
ficult to achieve. For example, Bar-Yam (Bar-Yam 2005) discusses the failure of design
and implementation of the Advanced Automation Systems (AAS) in the previous cen-
tury. A centerpiece of AAS was the replacement of the air traffic control system near
airports. This process faced so many problems in terms of cost overruns, program de-
lays, and safety issues, that it could only be partially completed after an FAA emergence
decree. Bar-Yam argues that due to the level of complexity, different parts of the AAS
design are so interdependent that changes in one part may have unforeseen effects on
other parts.
Holland (Holland 2006) argues that there are few points through which the behavior
of complex socio-technical systems can be changed to a desired state. These points
named “lever points” are not where designers typically expect them to be. They are
points where an action has an amplifier effect on the entire performance. If these
points can be discovered, designers can make best use of them. There is however no
theory that tells where or how to look for these points (Holland 2006).
Airport operators are faced with different trade-offs every day. These trade-offs are
created by the complexities inherent to the processes managed and the finite resources
of operational systems (Hollnagel 2009). Potentially, there are conflicting goals leading
to dilemmas and bottlenecks that must be dealt with. An example would be how to
make sure that a new environmentally-oriented procedure is safe without putting air-
craft and people at risk? The widely established system engineering approach has not
been developed to capture the socio part of a socio-technical system well. Then it
should not come as a surprise when this creates unforeseen behavior that goes unno-
ticed during the development and implementation of a complex socio-technical system.
Instead, such socio-technical behavior should be identified early on in the development
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opment of changes in civil air transportation operations.
Emergent behavior by an air transportation system results from interactions between
the various human operators, technical systems, and procedures. The emergence con-
cept is central to complex socio-technical systems and refers to how collective proper-
ties arise from the properties of the parts. Examples in air transportation include the
impact on air traffic safety by new air traffic control techniques such as time-based spa-
cing, the impact on airport capacity or airline business by policies restricting airport
noise, the propagation of delays through the air transportation network, or the conse-
quences that multiple actors can have when coordinating together. The Tenerife airport
disaster for instance resulted from an interruption of routines among aircraft crew and
air traffic control, loss of communication accuracy, and low visibility conditions (Weick
1990). At the same time, one should be aware of the fact that current aviation also
works thanks to the explicit use of emergent behavior for the better. Examples of this
are the various control loops that are working in current ATM, within each aircraft it-
self and also those formed by the interplay between the aircraft crew and each ATM
center on its path. And there is no doubt that the role of control loops will only in-
crease for advanced ATM. Logically, one should expect that emergent behavior that is
not well understood is often characterized by poor performance, missed opportunities,
and the inability to quickly adapt to disturbances. Only once emergent behavior is well
understood, it may be exploited for the better.
In (Shah et al. 2005), it is well explained that the key difficulty of evaluating advanced
ATM operations is to address emergent behavior, i.e. behavior which emerges from the
combined dynamic actions and reactions by individual systems and humans within the
overall ATM system. This emergent behavior cannot be foreseen and evaluated by
examining the individual behaviors alone. To understand the behavior of a complex
socio-technical system we must understand how the parts act together to form the behav-
ior of the whole (Bar-Yam 2003). It is the goal of this research to study the emergence
concept in air transportation, and develop a deeper understanding of system-wide per-
formance issues and/or benefits arising from a change in design. In this paper we aim to
identify key lever points through which the safety of runway crossing operations at air-
ports can be significantly affected. Our approach is to embrace Agent-Based Modeling
and Simulation (ABMS) because it has been extensively used to: a) analyze complex
socio-technical systems and their emergent behavior (Shah et al. 2005; Chen & Cheng
2010; Stroeve et al. 2003; Wolfe et al. 2009); and b) address cases where agents need to
collaborate and solve problems in a distributed fashion (Klein et al. 2004). ABMS provides
a platform to integrate multiple heterogeneous components at different levels. Models of
actors, technological systems, and the operating environment as well as the interactions
between them can be naturally covered. Therefore, it is expected that an ABMS approach
will help: a) predicting airport system-wide behavior emerging from the interactions
between individual components; b) identifying and understanding key lever points;
and c) managing dependencies between the activities of multiple actors both at the
organizational and operational level.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section shortly discusses different per-
spectives on emergent behaviour, and identifies examples in the air transportation do-
main using a comprehensive taxonomy. This is followed by the methodology section
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section positions the runway crossing application in the broader context of agent-based
modeling. Here, the main agents, their entities, as well as their interactions are described.
The Monte Carlo Simulation results and conclusion are provided in the subsequent
sections. A short version of this paper has been published in (Bouarfa et al. 2013).
Emergent behavior in air transportation
There is a wide consensus that it is essential for future ATM developments to study and
understand emergent behavior (Shah et al. 2005; SESAR Consortium 2007; European
commission and Eurocontrol 2010; Everdij et al. 2011). In (European commission and
Eurocontrol 2010), it is explained that with the introduction of advanced ATM concepts
as considered in SESAR, yet unknown emergent risk may appear. Hazards that were not
anticipated before could rise as a result of new concepts, tools, or procedures. Next to this
negative aspect of emergence, positive emergent behavior would also be possible. (Woods
et al. 2010) explain that as much as new concepts could give rise to new vulnerabilities,
they could also remove existing ones. This positive aspect of emergence was also empha-
sized by Beart (Beart 2012) who claims that there are things that emergent systems can do
that other systems cannot:
– They are robust and resilient: There is no single-point of failure, so if a single unit
fails, becomes lost or is stolen, the system still works.
– They are well-suited to the messy real world: Human-engineered systems may be
‘optimal’ but often require a lot of effort to design and are fragile in the face of chan-
ging conditions. Importantly, they don’t need to have complete knowledge/understand-
ing to achieve a goal.
– They find a reasonable solution quickly and then optimize: In the real world, time
matters because decisions need to be taken while they are still relevant. Traditional
computer algorithms tend to not produce a useful result until they are complete (which
may be too late in case of avoiding an obstacle for instance).Different perspectives on emergence
Philosophers have long been interested in the concept of emergence, and especially in
trying to establish a common definition for this vague yet very useful concept. The term
has been in use since at least the time of Aristotle (Wikipedia 2012b) who referred to
emergence as “the whole is something over and above its parts, and not just the sum of
them all”. Two thousand years later, (Mill 1872) used the example of water to illustrate
the same idea. The term emergent was said to be coined by Lewes in his multi-volume
problems of life and mind (Lewes 1874–1879). Lewes argued that certain phenomena
produce “qualitative novelty”, or material changes that cannot be expressed in simple
quantitative terms. Quoting Lewes: “The emergent is unlike its components insofar as
these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference.”
(Casti 1997), like Lewes associates emergence with dynamic systems whose behavior
arises from the interaction among its parts and cannot be predicted from knowledge
about the parts in isolation. Crick explains in (Crick 1994) that: “The scientific mean-
ing of emergent, or at least the one I use, assumes that, while the whole may not be
the simple sum of its separate parts, its behavior can, at least in principle, be
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these parts interact”.
(Bedau 1997) distinguishes between two types of emergence namely, strong and weak
emergence. Strong emergence was defined as nominal emergence in which the emer-
gent properties are supervenient properties with irreducible downward causal powers.
In the second type “weak emergence,” the system’s global behavior derives from the op-
eration of micro-level processes, but the micro-level interactions are interwoven in
such a complicated network that the global behavior has no simple explanation. Bedau
argues that ‘strong’ emergence has had a prominent place in the philosophical discus-
sions but that its scientific credentials are very poor, whereas ‘weak emergence’ is con-
sistent with materialism and scientifically useful. Bedau proceeds to defend one version
of weak emergence (noting that there are other versions), which is: “A nominally emer-
gent property of a locally reducible system is called weakly emergent if it is derivable
from all of the micro facts of this system, but only by simulation.”
(Chalmers 2002) includes a notion of “unexpectedness” or “surprise” to the definition
of emergence, when providing alternative definitions for strong and weak emergence.
Other authors also refer to the notion of surprise, like (Sanz 2004) who defines emer-
gence as “just systemic behavior — nothing more, nothing less— that is difficult to pre-
dict in advance.” (Bedau 2002) explains that he left the notion of surprise absent on
purpose, due to it being rather subjective. Instead, Bedau claims that with his definition
of weak emergence in terms of simulation he is presenting objectivist approaches to
emergence, though he notes that his classification is not exhaustive.
The diverse writings on emergence show that the term emergence captures a broad
spectrum of system behavior. (Goldstein 1999) notes that “emergence functions not
much as an explanation but rather as a descriptive term pointing to the patterns, struc-
tures, or properties that are exhibited on the macro-scale”. Editor Lissack acknowl-
edged in his inaugural article on emergence and complex systems theory that “it is less
than an organized, rigorous theory than a collection of ideas that have in common the
notion that within dynamic patterns there may be underlying simplicity that can, in
part, be discovered through large quantities of computer power and through analytical,
logical, and conceptual developments.”Identifying emergence in air transportation
Air transport operations are feasible thanks to a complex socio-technical system involv-
ing interactions between human operators, technical systems, and procedures. These
interactions generate various types of emergent behavior, ranging from simple emer-
gence up to strong emergence. Understanding these types of emergence is critical for
effective decision-making. The more we learn about these types of emergence, the more
opportunities we identify to improve the performance of the air transportation system,
and prevent system failure. In this paper, we use the taxonomy proposed by (Fromm
2005; CAS wiki 2013) to illustrate various types of emergence in the air transportation
system. This taxonomy builds upon a simplified formulation for cellular automata
based on (Wolfram 1984). (Fromm 2005; CAS wiki 2013) distinguish between four pri-
mary classes (Types I-IV) based on the type of feedback observed in the phenomena.
Table 1 shows that the stronger the emergence, the less predictable are the emergent
Table 1 Types of emergence identified by Fromm (Fromm 2005; complex adaptive
systems wiki 2013)
Type of emergence Name Type of feedback Predictability
Type I Nominal or Simple Emergence No Feedback Predictable
Type II Weak Emergence Top-down feedback Predictable in principle
Type III Multiple Emergence Multiple feedback loops Not Predictable (Chaotic)
Type IV Strong Emergence Multiple feedback loops Not Predictable,
even in principle
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gence whereas type IV corresponds to strongest form of emergence.
Type I – Nominal or simple emergence
This type of emergence is totally predictable due to the controlled and planned inter-
action of the individual components. A machine for instance has a function which is
different from the function of its parts, but the overall function is well-known. In air
transportation, one can think of the multitude of technical systems either on-board the
aircraft or on the ground. There are no unpredicted or unexpected behavior patterns in
these systems.
Type II – Weak emergence
This type of emergence describes emergence with top-down feedback, which is predict-
able in principle, but not in every detail. The roles of the elements and agents are flex-
ible. Coherent global structures appear and become visible on a higher level of
organization through the local interaction of several autonomous agents. The top-down
feedback from the group imposes constraints on the local interactions. Examples from
air transportation include a sequence of flying aircraft, which limits the possible speed
adjustments of individual aircraft. The agents (e.g. flight crew) adjust their behavior
and their role in the group according to the actual context and situation (e.g. following
an ATC instruction, or TCAS warning). Feedback from the environment or group to
the agent is possible through this form of context dependency.
Type III – Multiple emergence
This type of emergence is characterized by multiple positive and negative feedback loops
appearing in complex systems with many agents. The behavior is not predictable and can
be chaotic. Completely new roles can appear while old ones disappear. Although air trans-
portation operations are feasible thanks to such feedback loops, chaotic behavior may
arise following some exceptional events. There are two categories of such exceptional
events: 1) catastrophic accidents involving one or two aircraft; and 2) events that push the
dynamics of the air transportation system far away from its point of operation and there-
fore dramatically affect the performance of the system. Examples of the latter are a terror
action causing closing down of air travel in large areas (e.g. 9/11 in 2001), a disease caus-
ing passengers to change their travel behaviour (e.g. SARS in 2003) or volcanic ashes
blocking air travel in a large area (e.g. Iceland volcano in 2010). Examples of the former
are fatal runway incursions (e.g. Linate runway collision in 2001), fatal mid-air collisions
(e.g. Ueberlingen mid-air in 2002), loss of control of an aircraft flying through a hazardous
weather system (e.g. Air France crash in Atlantic Ocean in 2009).
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This type of emergence is not predictable, even in principle, because it describes the
appearance of a completely new system in a multi-level or multi-scale system with
many levels. Combinatorial explosion renders any attempt of explaining emergent
macroscopic phenomena in terms of microscopic low-level phenomena useless and fu-
tile. An intermediate or mesoscopic level often protects the macroscopic level from the
microscopic level, i.e. the microscopic level is irrelevant to the behavior of the macro-
scopic level. Life is a strongly emergent property of genes, genetic code and nucleic/
amino acids, as is culture a strongly emergent property of language and writing sys-
tems. In the air transportation domain, one can think of the safety culture which is de-
scribed as the product of routine aspects of everyday practice as well as organizational
structure and rules (Leveson et al. 2005; Ek et al. 2007). However the causal relations
are not yet understood (Sharpanskykh & Stroeve 2011).Agent-Based Modeling
In order to understand complex socio-technical systems and their emergent behavior,
rigorous models are needed that allow us exploring their properties (Holland 2006).
One of these properties, is what Holland (Holland 2006) calls ‘lever points.’ These are
points where a simple intervention causes an important effect on system performance.
According to Holland, all complex systems that have been studied carefully exhibit
such points. In the same article, Holland suggests using ABMS to study and analyze
complex systems and capture their emergent behavior.
ABMS and complex socio-technical systems
The agent-based modeling paradigm is increasingly recognized as a powerful approach
to model and simulate complex socio-technical systems exhibiting emergent behavior
(Holland 1997). This is because it can represent important phenomena resulting from
the characteristics and behaviors of individual agents and their interactions (Railsback
& Grimm 2012). (Burmeister et al. 1997) discuss the benefits of using an agent-based
approach in domains that are functionally or geographically distributed into autono-
mous subsystems, where the subsystems exist in a dynamic environment, and the sub-
systems have to interact more flexibly. According to Burmeister, agent-based modeling
can be used to structure and appropriately combine the information into a comprehen-
sible form. For a large complex system such as a traffic system, they provide the tools
for analyzing, modeling, and designing the whole system in terms of its subsystems,
each with its own set of local tasks and capability. The integration can then be achieved
by modeling the interactions among the subsystems. So agent-based modeling provide
abstraction levels that make it simpler and more natural to deal with the scale and
complexity of problems in these systems. Agent components can be described at a high
level of abstraction, yet the resulting systems are very efficient (Burmeister et al. 1997).
(Burmeister et al. 1997) conclude that agent-based modeling reduce the complexity
in systems design by making available abstraction levels that lend themselves to a
more natural way of modeling the problem domain. They enhance the robustness and
adaptivity of systems by virtue of increasing the autonomy of subsystems and their self-
organization. In the same vein, Jennings (Jennings 2000) outlines that ABMS and
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shows that agent-based modeling techniques are particularly well suited to complex
systems because: a) they provide an effective way of partitioning the problem space of a
complex system; b) they provide a natural means of modeling complex systems through
abstraction; and c) they capture the interactions and dependencies.
Agents in air transportation
In the ABMS domain, although there is no widely agreed definition for an agent, there
is general consensus that autonomy is central to the notion of agency. (Wooldridge
2009) explains that part of the difficulty is that beyond this autonomy point various at-
tributes associated with agency are of different importance for different domains.
Among the various definitions in the literature for an agent are:
– An agent is anything that can be viewed as perceiving its environment through
sensors and acting upon that environment through effectors (Russel & Norvig 2006).
– An autonomous agent is a system situated within a part of an environment, which
senses that environment and acts upon on it, over time, in pursuit of its own
agenda and so as to effect what it senses in the future (Franklin & Graesser 1997).
– An agent is a computer system that is situated in some environment, and that is
capable of autonomous action in this environment in order to meet its delegated
objectives (Wooldridge 2009).
– An agent is a system with the following properties (Tessier et al. 2002):▪ It lives in an artificial world W
▪ It has facilities to sense W and to manipulate W
▪ It has a (at least partial representation of W
▪ It is goal-directed, and as a consequence it has the ability to plan its activities
▪ It can communicate with other agentsIn the context of air transportation, in particular where different actors, hardware,
and software are interacting elements of a complex socio-technical system, we consider
agents as autonomous entities that are able to perceive and act upon their environment.
These agents may be humans, systems, organizations, and any other entity that pursues
a certain goal. For instance, an air traffic controller can be viewed as an agent observing
his/her environment (displays, alerting systems, runway availability, etc.) and acting
upon this environment (e.g. through communicating with other agents like pilots/
other controllers, or turning off runway stop-bars remotely). The agent environment is
understood as all surrounding human and non-human agents.
Agent-based safety risk analysis
The aim of this paper is to position an active runway crossing application in the broader
context of agent-based modeling. This was motivated by the capability of this rather new
approach to obtain known and unknown emergent behaviors (Chan et al. 2010). Tradi-
tional safety approaches assume well defined cause-effect links that propagate the effects
of events contributing to the safety risk (e.g. sequential or epidemiological safety models).
However, recent views indicate that such models may not be adequate to represent the
complexity of modern socio-technical systems (Hollnagel et al. 2006). Instead, agent-
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technical perspective. By having distinguished a number of agents and their interactions,
the overall process can be analyzed as emerging from the individual agent processes. This
not only provides a transparent way of structuring the model, which supports the
analysis both conceptually and computationally, but also makes the model easier to
maintain, resulting in local model refinements instead of global changes. For the
runway crossing operation, a systematic comparison of the agent-based approach
against a sequence based approach has been made in (Stroeve et al. 2011). The study
revealed many advantages of the former approach, including considerable differences
in the risk results obtained. The only disadvantage however, is that the agent-based
approach requires computational modeling experience that differs from the expertise
of most current safety analysts. Finally, compared to the major simulation para-
digms, agent-based modeling can be used across all abstraction levels (see Figure 1)
which is necessary to cover all relevant agents who directly control the hazardous
process in the context of the runway crossing application.TOPAZ safety risk assessment methodology
Motivated by the need to model the dynamics, the stochastic, and the interactions of
safety critical multi-agent systems, NLR has developed the TOPAZ safety risk assess-
ment methodology, e.g. (Blom et al. 2001a; Blom et al. 2006). The quantitative part of
TOPAZ develops and evaluates an agent-based model through running Monte Carlo
simulations (Blom et al. 2009) in combination with bias and uncertainty analysis
(Everdij et al. 2006). Next to these techniques, TOPAZ also integrates human perform-
ance modeling (Blom et al. 2001b), and powerful petri net modeling syntax (Everdij &
Blom 2010). Applications of these modeling techniques requires dedicated expertise
from safety analysts. However, when the TOPAZ toolset is available, normal safety ex-
pertise is sufficient.Figure 1 Approaches (Paradigms) in simulation modelling on abstraction level scale (Borshchev &
Filippov 2004).
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In this section we explore ABMS to study emergent behavior in an active runway cross-
ing operation. Our study is performed in three main steps, namely:
1. Model the agents and their interactions with the environment: For example
human performance models of pilots and controllers interacting with
technical systems.
2. Run Monte Carlo Simulations of both nominal and off-nominal scenarios:
In order to assess the impact of agents’ individual performance on system
behavior.
3. Analyze system behavior: Explore an array of behaviors or parameters of system
performance to guide alternative selection and future development.
Active runway crossings and incursions
In many airports around the world, runway crossings are used by taxiing aircraft
from the apron area to the runway and vice versa. These crossings are attractive be-
cause they reduce the taxiing time and save fuel. However, they also have safety im-
plications, namely the risk of having a runway incursion. A runway incursion is
defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (ICAO 2007) as
“Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, ve-
hicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and
take-off of aircraft”. While a runway incursion does not imply a collision, the prob-
ability of an accident is not nil. One of the most famous aviation accidents is the
Tenerife airport disaster that occurred on March 1977. Two Boeing 747 aircraft, op-
erated by KLM and Pan American World Airways, respectively collided. While the
Pan American aircraft was taxiing, the KLM aircraft took off, resulting in a collision
causing 583 fatalities. This accident is the deadliest aviation accident in history
(Wikipedia 2012a). 35 years later, runway incursions are still frequently reported in
many countries. In the united states alone, preliminary data (FAA 2012) through the
end of August 2012 shows a total number of 1010 runway incursions in the year
2012, a 17 percent increase over the same span in 2011.
Researchers and planners operating from different perspectives have proposed
many options to address this problem, such as new technology (e.g. in aircraft, ATC
tower, or Airport) and new procedures such as ICAO compliant procedures. These
proposals aim to reduce the probability of runway incursions, and reduce the acci-
dent risk in case runway incursions occur. However, evaluating the impact of these
proposals is a demanding task, given the large number of human operators
and technical systems that closely interact at the airport. This paper evaluates the
safety risk of an active runway crossing operation from an agent-based modeling
perspective.Agent-based model of the active runway crossing operation
An agent-based model of the active runway crossing operation has been developed
in a series of studies (Stroeve et al. 2011; Stroeve et al. 2013). The agents in this oper-
ation and their interactions are shown in Figure 2. The developed agent-based model
Figure 2 Agent-based model of the active runway crossing operation showing the interactions
between the agents (Stroeve et al. 2011).
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agents involved. In these previous studies, it has been shown that the level of safety
in sociotechnical systems depends on the interactions between organizational en-
tities in their contextual conditions. In this paper we present the model in the wider
context of socio-technical systems and run new Monte Carlo Simulations of non-
nominal scenarios using this model.
In order to define the stochastic dynamics of the agents and their interactions un-
ambiguously, the agent-based model has been specified in terms of Stochastically
and Dynamically Colored Petri Nets (SDCPNs). SDCPNs are a powerful extension
over normal Petri nets in that they are able to represent general stochastic hybrid
processes in a form that supports powerful stochastic analysis (Everdij & Blom
2010). In view of the scope of the current paper, it suffices to describe this agent-
based model in normal language rather than in SDCPN language.
At the highest hierarchical level, the relevant agents in the active runway cross-
ing operation are identified. These agents are concurrently interacting with each
other and include human and non-human agents. The human agents are the flight
crew operating the aircraft, and the runway controller handling the traffic on the
runway and its crossings. The non-human agents represent the aircraft and ATC
system. In the context of the active runway crossing operation, the ATC system is
comprised of three components where each component is performing a number
of functions.
These components include: 1) the Radio/Telecommunication (R/T) system used
for communication between the controller and flight crew; 2) the Surveillance sys-
tem used for providing radar track data; and 3) the alerting system used to gener-
ate ATC alerts in safety critical situations.
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Human Agents
○ PF-TX: represents the Pilot Flying the Taxiing Aircraft.
○ PF-TO: represents the Pilot Flying the Taking-Off Aircraft.
○ ATCo-R: represents the Runway Controller.
Non-Human Agents
○ AC-TX: represents the Aircraft Taxiing.
○ AC-TO: represents the Aircraft Taking-Off.
○ ATC System: represents the ATC system.
The main entities within these agents as well as their interactions are described
below.Human agents
The human operators’ function in the distributed air transportation system includes
visual monitoring, perception, spatial reasoning, planning, decision-making, commu-
nication, procedure selection, and execution (Corker et al. 2008). In order to account
for these cognitive and perceptual functions of the human operators, human perform-
ance modeling has been used as a complementary technology (Blom et al. 2001b).
Figure 3 gives an overview of the main entities within the human agent’s internal
model in the context of advanced aviation concepts. This model applies to both the
ATCo-R and pilots.Figure 3 Overview of the internal model of a human agent and its interactions with its environment.
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vironment, their interpretation, and the projection of their future status (Endsley 1995).
Stroeve et al. (Stroeve et al. 2003) have captured these perception, interpretation, and
project notions of SA mathematically in terms of three components namely, State SA,
Mode SA, and Intent SA. The state SA represents the awareness by one agent of other
agents. In the context of the active runway crossing operation, this might be the aware-
ness of the flight crew about the state (position and speed) of their own aircraft and
other aircraft, or the awareness of the controller about traffic state at the airport. The
mode SA represents the awareness by one agent of the mode of other agents. This
mode could be for instance the flight phase of an aircraft, or status of an ATC alert.
The intent SA represents the awareness by one agent of the intent of other agents. The
intent includes continuous states of agents as well as the related times at which these
states are expected to be achieved. For example, intent SA may represent the expecta-
tions by a runway controller of aircraft destination, and the time it will arrive at a cer-
tain waypoint. The timing of the situation awareness updates depends on the initiation
and duration of related tasks (e.g. monitoring, communication, coordination).
The information processing entity considers processing of information from the en-
vironment that leads to actions that may influence the environment. This entity is
based on task analysis, which takes into account the multiple resources model
(Wickens 1992). The idea reflected by this model is that humans have several different
mental capacities with resource properties. In this view, task interference depends on
the extent to which tasks use the same resources: two difficult tasks may be time-
shared easily if they use different types of resources (Blom et al. 2001b). The principal
idea behind the model is that human cognitive effort can be divided over several activ-
ities. This may account for failures in time-sharing between competing activities, since
the human cognitive effort is limited. So, the underlying assumption is that the human
is an information processing system with limited processing capacity. The human infor-
mation processing entity focuses on how this limited processing capacity can be used
to time-share several processing tasks. Its sub-entities include:
– Task Identification: Considers the ways the human operator identifies the tasks that
need to be performed at a particular time instance.
– Task Scheduling: Determines which tasks may be performed concurrently, as well
as a priority among the tasks that cannot be performed concurrently.
– Task Load: Describes the number of tasks to be performed and/or the resources
required by tasks at the level of visual, auditory, cognitive and motor performance.
– Decision Making: Decision Making processes are based on decision rules dedicated
to the scenario considered. In an active runway crossing operation, this could be
how to react to a conflict situation.
– Task execution: Considers the dynamic and stochastic performance characteristics
of tasks.
This Cognitive Control entity considers that humans can function in a number of
cognitive control modes such as: Strategic, Tactical, Opportunistic, and Scrambled
(Hollnagel 1993). The cognitive control mode may depend on the taskload sub-entity
which describes the range of tasks to be done or the situation awareness of the human.
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performance.
Non-human agents
The model of the aircraft agent represents aircraft dynamics in different flight
phases, which is a function of the aircraft type (see Figure 4). For AC-TX the model
represents aircraft movement during taxiing, including braking as a means to avoid a
collision. For AC-TO, it represents the ground run, airborne transition and airborne
climb-out phases during takeoff. It also includes the possibility of a rejected takeoff
by the pilot.
The main entities within the ATC system agent include the surveillance system, the
alerting system, and R/T communication system (see Figure 5).
– The model of the surveillance system provides position and velocity estimates for
both aircraft. The surveillance data is used by the alerting system.
– The alerting system generates two types of alerts in case surveillance data indicate
a safety critical situation. The alerts include 1) a stopbar violation alert in case
AC-TX has passed the stopbar, and 2) a runway incursion alert in case AC-TX is
within a critical distance of the runway center-line and AC-TO has exceeded a
velocity threshold in front of the runway crossing. There is a chance that the
surveillance system is not available, resulting in track loss and no alerts being
generated.
– The model for the R/T communication system between ATCo-R and pilots
accounts for the communication system of the aircraft, the communication system
of the ATCo-R, the tower communication system, and the frequency selection of
the aircraft communication system. The nominal status of these communication
systems accounts for direct non-delaying communication. The model accounts for
the chance of delay or failure of the communication systems.Figure 4 Overview of the internal model of the aircraft agent and its interactions with its environment.
Figure 5 Overview of the internal model of the ATC system agent and its interactions with
its environment.
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The operational conditions in the active runway crossing operation are characterized
by two elements namely the runway configuration and visibility conditions. For the
first element, runway characteristics such as runway length, width, location of
stopbars, and number of branches are specified. Each branch is of the class holding,
crossing, or exit. For the second element, four different visibility conditions are
represented.
Environment of each agent
Each agent is situated in its environment, from which this agent perceives information
and acts upon its environment (See Figures 4, 5 and 6).
Active runway crossing operation
In the active runway crossing operation, we consider a departure runway that is used
by AC-TO and has a crossing taxiway at a distance of 1000 m from the runway thresh-
old (see Figure 6). The runway crossing is used by the taxiing aircraft (AC-TX) to cross
the active runway. In this experiment, we focus on the scenario that the taxiing aircraft
is crossing the runway while it should not, due to a wrong intent situation awareness of
its flight crew. Such condition has been shown in previous work to have a strong effect
on accident risk (Stroeve et al. 2003; Stroeve et al. 2009). Evaluating the conditional
collision risks associated with this condition provides more insight on the collision risk
contributions.
In the active runway crossing operation, AC-TX enters the taxiway leading to the
runway crossing at a position close to the stopbar, whereas AC-TO initiates take-off
Figure 6 Schematic overview of the traffic situation considered. The taking-off aircraft accelerates along the runway while the crew of the taxiing aircraft intends to proceed along the taxiway
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uniformly distributed around the take-off time of AC-TO. In addition, both AC-TX
and AC-TO may be medium-weight or heavy-weight. The operation is assumed to be
without restricted visibility range in line with visibility condition 1 of ICAO (ICAO
2004). This implies that the involved human operators can visually observe the traffic
situation.
The pilots PF-TO and PF-TX are both responsible for the safe conduct of the flight
operations and should actively monitor for potential conflicting traffic situations.
ATCo-R is responsible for the safe and efficient traffic handling on the runway and the
runway crossings.
During taxiing and take-off, both PF-TX and PF-TO visually monitor the traffic situ-
ation at stochastically distributed times. Both pilots may detect a safety critical situation
by their own observation. PF-TO observes a conflict when AC-TX is observed to be
within a critical distance to the runway centerline. PF-TX observes a conflict when AC-
TO is observed to be approaching AC-TX with an increasing speed, and AC-TX is
within a critical distance from the runway centerline.
Next to their own monitoring actions, pilots of both AC-TX and AC-TO may also
detect a conflict following a call from ATCo-R. In this case, the R/T communication
system is used for communication between ATCo-R and the flight crew. ATCo-R
may detect a conflict during monitoring if AC-TX is observed to have passed the
stopbar, or following an ATC alert. The ATC alerting system may generate two types
of alerts to warn ATCo-R: 1) A runway incursion alert for the situation that AC-TX
is crossing the runway in front of AC-TO that has initiated take-off; and 2) A stopbar
violation alert for the situation that AC-TX crosses an active stopbar.
These alerts consist of audible warnings and an indication on the ground surveil-
lance display. The alerts are based on radar tracking data (Aircraft position and vel-
ocity estimates) provided by the surveillance system.
Following conflict detection, PF-TX may decide to start a full braking action or con-
tinue crossing in case AC-TX is within a critical distance of the runway center line.
Likewise, PF-TO may decide to start a full braking action or continue taking off if it is
too late to brake.Results and discussion
Monte Carlo simulation results
To better understand the potential of agents to restrict the risk in cases where the per-
formance of other agents is affected, one or more agents can be placed out of the mon-
itoring role in the Monte Carlo simulations. This is done for all agents that are capable
of detecting a conflict in the active runway crossing operation, namely PF-TO, PF-TX,
ATCo-R, and the ATC alerting system. The conditions for placing these agents out of
the monitoring role are:
– PF-TX does not actively monitor the traffic situation visually, such that he may only
detect a conflict via a call of ATCo-R.
– PF-TO does not actively monitor the traffic situation visually, such that he may
only detect a conflict via a call of ATCo-R.
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only detect a conflict through ATC alerts.
– The ATC alerting system does not generate any alerts.
The conditions above refer to the situation at the start and during the active run-
way crossing operation, and they are not assumed to hold prior to the occurrence of
the crossing operation. Combining these conditions results in sixteen cases where
agents are either monitoring or not monitoring the traffic situation. A total of 1 mil-
lion Monte Carlo simulation runs were performed for each of the sixteen combina-
tions. The Monte Carlo method was used to capture the stochastic nature of the
various agents in the active runway crossing operation. The conditional collision risk
was obtained by dividing the number of collisions by the number of performed simu-
lations for each case.
Figure 7 shows the conditional collision risk results corresponding to the sixteen
cases. The conditional collision risk lies between 1,7E-4 and 9,5E-2. The lowest value
corresponds to the nominal case C1 where the performance of agents is not affected.
Here all agents operate according to the active runway crossing operation described
in the previous section. The highest collision risk corresponds to the hypothetical
case C16 where none of the agents is actively involved in recognizing the conflict
and avoiding a collision. In this case, the risk increases by a factor of 556 with respect
to case C1.
The conditional collision risk results in Figure 7 can be divided into two main cat-
egories. The first category is characterized by low to medium risk increase factors and
includes the first seven cases C1 to C7 on the left-hand side. The second category is
characterized by high risk increase factors and includes cases C8 to C16 on the right-
hand side.
In the first category, the risk increase factors are low for all cases except for case
C6 which has a medium risk increase factor. The low factors are between 1.1 and 2.
This means that agents can restrict the conditional collision risk in some cases where
the performance of one or more agents is affected. These cases are:
– Case C2 - ATC alerts are not generated.
– Case C3 - ATCo-R is not actively monitoring the traffic situation visually.
– Case C4 - ATC alerts are not generated and ATCo-R is not actively monitoring the
traffic situation visually.
– Case C5 - PF-TO is not monitoring the traffic situation visually.
– Case C7 - Both PF-TO and ATCo-R are not actively monitoring the traffic
situation visually.
In the second category, the risk increase factor with respect to C1 is between 60
and 556. The risk levels are high and are in the range between 1.0E-2 (case C9) and
9.5E-2 (case C16). In almost all cases of the second category, PF-TX was not actively
monitoring the traffic situation (cases C9-C16). The only exception is Case C8 where
the conditional collision risk is around 1.8E-2. In this case however, the performance
of all other agents was affected to attain similar risk levels corresponding to cases
without active monitoring of PF-TX.
Figure 7 Conditional collision risk results corresponding to different cases where agents are
monitoring (white cells with yes) or not monitoring (grey cells with no). The value on top of each bar
represents the risk increase factor with respect to case C1a. PF-TX refers to Pilot-Flying Taxiing Aircraft. PF-
TO refers to Pilot-Flying Taking-Off Aircraft. ATCo-R stands for Runway Controller.
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collision risk in case the performance of other agents is affected. The role of each
agent is explained below:
PF-TX
The results show that an actively monitoring PF-TX restricts the risk in cases where
the performance of one or two agents is affected (cases C1 to C7). The risk increase
factor with respect to case C1 is between 1.1 and 12.5. In addition, all cases without ac-
tive monitoring of PF-TX, are characterized by a high conditional collision risk. The
risk increase factor with respect to C1 varies between 60 and 556.
PF-TO
The conditional collision risk is increased by a factor of 1.9 in the hypothetical case C5
where PF-TO is the only agent not monitoring the traffic situation. In case C8, where no
ATC alerts are generated and both PF-TO and ATCo-R are not monitoring, the risk is
higher by a factor of 76 with respect to case C4. This indicates that an active monitoring
of PF-TO considerably restricts the risk in cases that involve both the lack of monitoring
of ATCo-R, and malfunctioning of ATC alerts (Case C4 versus C8). The risk is also re-
duced by the active monitoring of PF-TO (factor of 11) in case no ATC alerts are gener-
ated (Case C2 versus C6). The role of PF-TO in restricting the risk is however limited
when PF-TX is not actively monitoring the traffic situation. This can be noticed when
comparing cases C9 with C13, C10 with C14, C11 with C15, and C12 with C16.
ATCo-R
The comparison of cases with and without active traffic monitoring by ATCo-R indi-
cate that in most cases, the controller’s observation does not significantly restrict the
risk. This can be noticed when comparing case C1 with case C3. The active monitoring
by ATCo-R does reduce the risk with only a factor of 1.1. Close factors can be found
when comparing cases C2 with C4, C5 with C7, C9 with C11, C10 with C12, C13 with
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C6 with C8. Here the controller’s own visual observation does play a role in restricting
the conditional collision risk when the PF-TO is not monitoring the traffic situation
and the ATC alerts are not functioning.
ATC alerts
The comparison of cases with and without alerts indicates that in most cases ATC
alerts barely reduce the collision risk. This can be noticed when comparing cases C1
and C2. In case C1, ATC alerts are generated in case of safety-critical situations, and
can be detected by ATCo-R. In case C2, No ATC alerts are generated as described in
the experiment set-up. Looking at both cases, the risk increases by a factor of 1.1
meaning that ATC alerts do not significantly reduce the conditional collision risk. A
similar remark can be made when comparing C3 with C4, C9 with C10, and C11 with
C12. In all these cases, the presence of ATC alerts does reduce the risk by a factor no
larger than 1.5. This indicates that alerts to ATCo-R are often too late resulting in late
instructions to the PF-TX as manifest from C9 and C11. Only in cases without active
monitoring of PF-TO and at the same time with active monitoring of PF-TX, do alerts
restrict the risk by higher factors. This can be noticed when comparing cases C5 with
C6, and C7 with C8. Here, the conditional collision risk is reduced by a factor of 6.5
and 46 respectively due to ATC alerts. However, if the PF-TX is out of the monitoring
role, the contribution of ATC alerts in restricting the risk is reduced to a factor of 1.9
and 4.2 for the cases C13 versus C14, and C15 versus C16 respectively. These results
indicate that ATC alerts are of little help to ATCo-R in cases where PF-TX is not ac-
tively monitoring the traffic situation. They are often too late to prevent collisions.Monte Carlo simulation events
In the Monte Carlo simulation, a number of event occurrences was defined and
recorded in order to have more insight regarding the interactions between agents and
their relation to accident risk. These event occurrences included conflict detection by
the agents, their actions, as well as the consequences of these actions. In a Monte Carlo
simulation run, the time τq of the first occurrence of event Eq together with the pos-
ition of the aircraft at time τq were recorded. This is helpful to understand how a colli-
sion emerges from the interactions between agents, through tracing back possible
sequences of events preceding a collision. The authors came up with a novel method to
visualize possible sequences of events resulting from the interactions between the
agents (Figure 8). For instance, Figure 8 indicates that an ATC alert (event E4) may re-
sult in warnings specified by ATCo-R towards the flight crew of both taxiing and
taking-off aircraft (event E8). The possible sequences of events with the corresponding
simulated scenarios are summarized in Table 2.
Figures 9 and 10 show probability distribution functions of relevant event times for
case C1 described in Figure 7. Figure 9 corresponds to simulation runs that have
resulted in a collision, whereas Figure 10 corresponds to simulation runs that have not
resulted in a collision. Comparing the two figures show that, for the nominal case C1,
early detection of a potential conflict by the human agents play a key role in restricting
the accident risk.
Figure 8 Recorded events in the Monte Carlo simulation and their relation with collision in the
active runway crossing operation. Eq (q = 1,2,…,10) represents the event number, τq represents the time
of the first occurrence of event Eq, ‘∧ ’ means that both events Ei and Ej should have occurred in order for
the next event to happen such that τi ∧ τj = max {τi, τj}, ‘∨ ’ means that as soon as one of the (competing)
events occur, the next event will happen such that τi ∨ τj = min {τi, τj}, G is a guard function evaluating the
first time τ10 that trajectories of AC-TO and of AC-TX are such close that the aircraft shapes hit each other.
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The results suggest that if PF-TX is not actively monitoring the traffic situation, then
the conditional collision risk is high, and then the role of PF-TO, ATCo-R, and alerts
in restricting the risk is rather limited. This can be explained by the condition con-
sidered in this experiment regarding the intent situation awareness of PF-TX. Here,
PF-TX crosses the runway without contacting ATCo-R because he is not aware about the
runway crossing. PF-TX can only detect a conflict in two cases: 1) when PF-TX observes
that AC-TO is approaching AC-TX (Event E3 in Figure 10) or 2) when PF-TX timely re-
ceive an R/T call from ATCo-R (Event 8 in Figure 10). This means that if PF-TX is not ac-
tively monitoring the traffic situation, the only way to detect a conflict is through an R/TTable 2 Possible sequences of events before a collision
Seq. nr. Possible sequences of events High risk restriction cases Low risk restriction cases
1 (E1 ∧ E2)→ E3→ E7→ E10 C1-C7 C8
2 (E1 ∧ E2)→ E6→ E9→ E10 C1-C4 C9-C12
3 (E1 ∧ E2)→ E4→ E8→ E7 → E10 C1, C3, C5, C7 C9, C11, C13, C15
4 (E1 ∧ E2)→ E5→ E8→ E7 → E10 C1, C2, C5, C6 C9, C10, C13, C14
5 (E1 ∧ E2)→ E4→ E8→ E9 → E10 C1, C3, C5, C7 C9, C11, C13, C15
6 (E1 ∧ E2)→ E5→ E8→ E9 → E10 C1, C2, C5, C6 C9, C10, C13, C14
7 (E1 ∧ E2)→ E4→ E8→ (E7 ∧ E9)→ E10 C1, C3, C5, C7 C9, C11, C13, C15
8 (E1 ∧ E2)→ E5→ E8→ (E7 ∧ E9)→ E10 C1, C2, C5, C6 C9, C10, C13, C14
9 (E1 ∧ E2)→ E10 NA C16
The table maps different possible sequences of events with corresponding cases as defined in Figure 8.
Figure 9 Conditional probability distribution functions of relevant event times for runs corresponding
to case C1 that have resulted in a collision.
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has already started crossing. A similar evaluation of the results for the PF-TO shows an-
other picture. For PF-TO, the call from ATCo-R does restrict the collision risk consider-
ably. This can be noticed by comparing cases C5 and C8. This is mainly because PF-TO
has more time compared to PF-TX to start a collision avoidance braking action, as is
manifest from the recorded aircraft positions. The comparison of both of these cases also
shows that the call from ATCo-R was mainly triggered by the ATC alerting system.Figure 10 Conditional probability distribution functions of relevant Event times for runs corresponding
to case C1 that have not resulted in a collision.
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ment and simulation of the agent-based model in the wider context of socio-technical
systems. The ABMS approach covered both the socio and technical parts through: a) de-
veloping the internal model of both human operators and technical systems; and b) cap-
turing the totality of their interactions through Monte Carlo simulations. This is an
example where emergent behavior of type II has been predicted thanks to agent-based
modeling and simulation (Figure 7). In addition, the events recorded in the Monte Carlo
simulation revealed unpredicted behavior regarding the sequence of conflict detection by
the agents. Normally, in the context of the runway crossing operation, one would expect
according to the ConOps, that conflicts would be first detected by ATCo-R who will then
warn the pilots. However, this might not necessarily always be the case. It was shown that
PF-TX might detect a conflict even before ATCo-R which could lead to an accident if de-
tection by the pilot is too late (e.g. Figure 9). Such unpredictable behavior can be chaotic
and falls under the category multiple emergence type III. In such type of emergence,
complete new roles can appear while old ones disappear.Conclusion
Emergent behavior in the open socio-technical air transportation system results from
the interactions between the constituent elements and the operating environment. For
an airport, these elements include human operators and their organizations, working
procedures, technical systems, and weather. Changing the characteristics of these ele-
ments or the way they interact may have an impact on the overall system behavior.
Both the operating environment and the socio-technical system elements influence the
evolution over time. On the one hand, weather conditions for instance may be a factor
in deciding which flight plan to file or which runway configuration to use. On the other
hand, flight progress may change as a result of pilots and controller’s decisions. In
order to identify which changes at the “elements” level do have a significant impact on
the emergent behavior of the socio-technical system, models of constituent elements
and their interactions are required.
In this paper, Monte Carlo Simulations of an agent-based model were performed to as-
sess the safety risk of an active runway crossing operation. The safety performance of such
an operation depends on the coordination between the runway controller, pilots, and tech-
nology all functioning together. The agent-based model has been developed in a hierarch-
ical way. At the highest level, the relevant agents including human operators and technical
systems were identified. Then the interactions between these agents were captured and in-
cluded deterministic and stochastic relationships, as is appropriate for the human perform-
ance or the technical systems considered. The impact on the emergent safety behavior was
studied through running simulations of both nominal and off-nominal scenarios.
It has been explained that ATM is a complex socio-technical system that exhibits
various types of emergent behavior ranging from simple emergence, through weak
emergence, up to strong emergence. It has been demonstrated that Agent-Based
Modeling and Monte Carlo Analysis provide a platform to integrate and simulate
multiple heterogeneous components at different levels, and identify different types
of emergence through modeling the interactions between technical systems, human
operators, working procedures, and environment.
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conditional collision risk is limited in cases without active monitoring of the PF-
TX. Another interesting result is that although the role of the controller’s own ob-
servation does not restrict the risk in some cases, it plays a significant role in cases
without active monitoring of PF-TO and no ATC alerts being generated. These
findings are revealed due to the development and simulation of the agent-based
model that covers the totality of interactions of components and their variability in
performance over time. The Monte Carlo simulations make it possible to under-
stand the potential of agents in restricting the risk in off-nominal scenarios, through
capturing their stochastic nature.
Endnote
aIn this paper, the aggregated simulation included extra combinations compared to
(Stroeve et al. 2013). This way the role of ATC alerts in restricting the risk becomes
clearer in cases where the controller is not actively monitoring the traffic situation visu-
ally (e.g. cases C3, C7, C11, and C15).
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